Introduction
Agent splitting was initially proposed as a possible response of an agent to task overloads [SHE 98] . Compared with the classical approach where facilitator agents are responsible for task allocation and re-allocation among those subordinate agents, agent splitting is per se an internal load-balancing mechanism, because an agent can decide whether, when, and how to split itself, and separate its concerns through delegating the excess computing tasks to its clones proactively.
Mobile agents consume fewer network resources by transferring computation logics to those sites holding the information to be processed rather than pulling large amount of data from remote sites [KOT 99a ]. However, the full benefits of mobile computing could not be leveraged if megalithic agents are allowed to transfer around the network without any restriction. As far as security is concerned, being exposed too much (the full computation logics) to the outside, a mobile agent is more vulnerable to attacks from other malicious agents. In [FAN 99 ], agent splitting was used to fine-tune the performance of mobile agents. The idea is that whenever an agent needs to transfer itself to other site, it will split up and transfer only those part of computing logics and relevant information that are requisite for the task to be done.
However, both approaches focus on procedural knowledge (computation logics) only. The former examined how to delegate the excess tasks of an agent to its clones so that resources can be utilized effectively, while the latter studied how to achieve separation of concerns by partitioning the plan library (recipes for task execution) appropriately so that the resulted clones could focus on their own responsibility.
When we come to strong agency where agents usually have mental attitudes like beliefs, goals, intentions, etc., agent splitting may further face the issue of how to split up these mental structures. There are at least four benefits in exploring the splitting strategies for the mental structures of an agent. First, it can be employed by an agent to separate its concerns. The behavior and commitments of an agent are governed by its mental attitudes. For instance, the goal selection and action commitments of an agent rely on its current belief state (information about its environment). Suppose for an agent a plan is enabled if the precondition of the plan is a logical consequence of the agent's current belief state. Each of such enabled plans brings up a concern for the agent and attracts certain attention from the agent. Usually these planned activities may involve several independent concerns, multiple levels of concerns (zoom-in/zoom-out), or even competitive concerns. By separating independent and competitive concerns from each other, an agent can generate smaller and smarter clones, each of which could save time and efforts in its deliberation computing. For example, the performance of a mobile agent with mental attitudes could be improved further by restricting its concern to only those computing logics and sub-mental state that are relevant to the task to be done. In agent teamwork, especially for the time stress domains (e.g., RoboCup Rescue), focus of concern is critical for improving team performance.
Second, shifting of concerns occurs frequently in multi-agent systems. As well as the potential benefits of workload balance resulted from creating new clones, splitting mental structures will also enable an agent to adjust its concerns dynamically based on its recognition of the current situation. For instance, when an agent realizes it has been switching its intention from one activity (task) to another, it will be better if the agent can take only those subset of beliefs relevant to the current activity into consideration when doing deliberation computing. Agents will benefit more significantly from such mental splitting when they are running in a time-stress domain with overwhelming information (belief) exchanges. Mental splitting may also be leveraged by agents to make better decisions. For instance, Recognition-Primed Decision model (RPD) [KLE 98 ] refers to a decision-making process where situation awareness and situation shifting play important roles. Agents using RPD will be more intelligent in making rapid and rational decisions if they can adjust their concerns when situation shifting occurs.
Third, mental splitting can be employed as a critical process for maintaining the shared mental models among a team of agents [FAN 02 ]. The idea is based on the assumption that a group of agents (they may be distributed in different physical sites) could be treated logically as a single entity, referred as a composite agent [SOK 02]. Upon receiving a high-level task, the composite agent could (1) select an appropriate plan (from pre-defined plan library, or generated dynamically) based on the results of situation awareness and situation assessment; (2) distribute its mental attitudes (e.g., goals, intentions, procedural knowledge, etc.) appropriately into its subordinate agents according to their respective responsibilities needed in the chosen plan; (3) after finishing the shared team plan, all the agents unite together and become a composite agent again. Such a splitting-uniting process may iterate forever. In this process, the shared mental model is evolved as this: upon splitting, the mental model (observable information, shared team plans, common goals, etc.) will be shared by all the subordinate as common knowledge [FAG 95 ]; upon team uniting, the team mental model will be renewed by combining together all the fresh information acquired by team members in this round (which in the next round, will be shared by all the team members again). In short, the mental model of a team is shared from the beginning, and evolved periodically. Such an approach of maintaining shared mental models can be best employed in periodic team synchronization (PTS) domains [STO 99] (e.g., robotic soccer, search and rescue, battlefield combat, etc.), where agents can periodically synchronize their behaviors with no restriction on communication.
Lastly, recent psychological studies about human teamwork have shown that members of an effective team can often anticipate needs of other teammates and choose to assist them proactively based on a shared mental model [ROU 92] , and [YEN ] shows software agents can be empowered with similar proactive capabilities to improve team performance. One interesting issue is how to anticipate the information needs of teammates, as well as how to tell whether a piece of information is relevant to a specific information need. Mental splitting is certainly helpful in alleviating the complexity of reasoning about relevant information, and in better anticipating both explicit and implicit information needs based on the recognition of the current situation. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we give the concept of inference chain in an abstract deduction structure, and prove that for any finite deduction structure there exists a unique concise-widest chain-preserved split. In section 3, we first model the mental structures (e.g., belief, goal, intention) of an agent as finite deduction structures, and then propose a logical splitting strategy based on the unique concise-widest chain-preserved split of an agent's belief component. Split as such, all the inference chains in the original belief structure can be preserved. Related works are discussed in section 4, and in section 5 we conclude the paper and point out some problems for future studies.
Logical Splitting
In this section, we explore how to split a deduction structure such that all the inference chains in the original structure can be preserved in at least one resulted substructure. This is basically about dividing up logical theories, such that every theorem obtainable by a chain of implications from the original theory is obtainable from one of the sub-theories. Among such chain-preserved splits of a deduction structure, there exist a unique concise-widest split.
We first introduce abstract deduction structure. DEFINITION 1. -An abstract deduction structure is a pair ∆, ρ , where ∆ is a set of abstract formulas, and ρ is a set of abstract inference rules. Any n-ary abstract rule r ∈ ρ is a partial function of type ∆ n → ∆(0 < n).
In the following, we assume all the deduction structures are consistent, and call the inconsistent structures pseudo-deduction structures 1 . Let ρ be a relation between a set of formulas and a formula, where ∆ ρ ϕ means ϕ can be proved from ∆ by using only the rules in ρ. 
Obviously D is a pre-order.
The abstract deduction structure can be reified to get concrete deduction structures. For example, if we let ∆ be propositional wffs, and let ρ = {M P } (M P refers to the modus ponens rule), we can get a deduction system for propositional logics.
Chain-preserved Splits
We are interested in splitting up a deduction structure such that every theorem obtainable from the original structure is obtainable from one of the resulted substructures. We first define a closure operator.
Let ary(r), dom(r) denote the arity and range domain of function r, respectively, and Sub(S) denote the set of sub-formulas of S.
where
The functions defined for abstract deduction structures can be instantiated as follows when ρ is just PROOF. -It's easy to prove that P chain d satisfies the following three properties:
Let's take a concrete structure as an example to explain the concept of inference chain. Suppose ∆, ρ is a deduction structure where ∆ is a set of propositional wffs and ρ = {M P }. An inference chain in ∆ is a maximal sequence of formulas 3 2. Note that it does not hold when ⊂ is substituted for ⊆.
A sequence c of formulas satisfying constraint Q is maximal if there is no distinct sequence c satisfying Q such that c is only a section of c .
, where only q 0 might be the constant true (in such cases, q 1 ∈ ∆). In such case, we are interested in splitting ∆ into a family of subsets
In other words, if a fact can be derived from ∆, it should also be derivable from some
can not be split further, for otherwise, m will not be derivable.
P chain has the following properties.
PROOF. -(i) and (ii) follow directly from the closure properties of P chain d .
Since for any α ∈ P chain
, we prove (iii) by induction on k.
∆ is a set of first-order wffs, and ρ = {M P, G}, where G is the generalization rule. Then, for any A, B ⊆ ∆, we have
-For any deduction structure ∆, ρ , there exists at least one trivial chain-preserved split of ∆, i.e., {∆}. For non-trivial splits, suppose ∆, {M P } is a structure where
The following lemma shows that chain-preserved splits can be generated from an existing split.
is a concise-widest split, and {a, a → b} is isolated.
Given any collection Γ of sets, suppose by trim(Γ) we can get the contraction set of Γ such that
By definition, a split Γ is concise means the subset relation over Γ is empty. Thus, to make Γ concise is actually a process of contracting Γ as far as possible. On the contrary, a split Γ is widest means each individual element of Γ can not be split further without losing the property of chain-preserveness. Thus, the process of widening a split is to expand the split as far as possible. There may exist some equilibrium when applying these two opposite processes. Then, it's natural to talk about the existence and uniqueness of the concise and widest split of a set of formulas.
We have the following result for concise-widest chain-preserved splits.
THEOREM 13. -For any deduction structure ∆, ρ , there exists a unique concisewidest chain-preserved split of ∆, if ∆ is finite.
To prove this theorem we will show the existence and uniqueness of concise-widest chain-preserved split separately. The following lemma is needed to prove the existence.
Since Γ is a concise split, there is no r ∈ ρ that relates Φ k and Φ k − Φ k , hence Φ k can be separated from Φ k , which contradicts the fact that Φ is concise and widest.
s PROOF. -We construct a chain-preserved split for ∆ which is both concise and widest.
The algorithm for constructing a concise-widest chain-preserved split for ∆:
First, we show "Γ is a concise chain-preserved split of ∆" is an invariant of loop (2). The algorithm proceeds from {∆}, which is a concise chain-preserved split of ∆. After statement (4), Ψ is a concise chain-preserved split of Φ, hence, Γ is a chainpreserved split of ∆ after statement (5), and becomes concise after (6). Moreover, since loop (1) won't stop until there is no Γ i ∈ Γ such that Γ i can be further split to get a longer concise chain-preserved split of ∆, thus, the resulting split is widest. The algorithm is terminable since ∆ is finite. s
Before we prove the uniqueness of concise-widest chain-preserved split, we give two auxiliary lemmas.
LEMMA 17. -Given any structure ∆, ρ , for any
We only need to show Γ 3 ⊂ Γ 1 .
Assume Γ 3 = Γ 1 . Since Γ 2 is isolated, there is no r ∈ ρ such that Γ 2 can be related with formulas in 
We prove for any
Since Γ is concise and widest, γ 1 , · · · , γ k must be related by some rule(rules), then φ 1 , · · · , φ k should also be related by the same rule(rules), so, φ 1 , · · · , φ k can not exist separately in Φ, which contradicts the fact that Φ is concise and widest.
Assume Γ i ⊂ Φ j . Since Γ i is isolated, by lemma(17) and lemma(18), we have
} is a longer chain-preserved split than Φ, which causes contradict. Thus Φ j = Γ i . Hence, for any Γ i there is a corresponding Φ j such that Φ j = Γ i , we have Γ = Φ. s
When ρ = {M P }, we can define an order relation over a set of formulas.
Obviously, ∆ is not a partial ordered set. For example, {a, For any deduction structure ∆, ρ where ∆ is finite, let cp(∆) be the set of all the chain-preserved splits of ∆, and wcp(∆) ∈ cp(∆) be the unique concise-widest split of ∆.
Splitting the Mental Structures of Agents
In this section, we will apply the results from the previous section to propose a logical splitting strategy for agents based on the chain-preserved splits or the concisewidest chain-preserved split of their belief structures. Such mental splitting will make an agent become smarter in reasoning and more rapid in reaction because the agent could focus its attention on the most relevant part when doing deliberation computing. To do this, we first need to model the belief attitudes of an agent as a deduction structure. To compare the reasoning power of an agent before and after mental splitting 4 , we also need to deal with the issue of mental (belief) revision.
Mental Attitudes Modeled as Deduction Structures
Among the existing agent models (in the Artificial Intelligence viewpoint), mental attitudes often involve knowledge, belief, desire, intention, preference, etc. Conventionally, the knowledge component of an agent is composed of true facts about the world accumulated so far [FAG 95 ]; The belief attitude reflects an agent's models about itself, its environment and the other coexisting agents; A goal specifies certain 4. It's more complicated while more interesting when comparing the power of an agent and its splits who have undergone a sequence of events that might affect the world states. For example, due to different observability, two split agents may come to hold conflict beliefs (e.g., one sticks to its previous beliefs, while another has revised its beliefs with new observed information). In such cases, it's critical to find appropriate solutions to conflict reconciliation. . Upon an agent receiving stimulus (external activations such as task entrusting, information requesting, coordination messages, etc., or internal invoking events such as deleting or adding beliefs or goals), instances of those plans (in its plan library) whose invocation events coincide with the stimulus will be collected to form a candidate plan set P . However, not all the plan instances in P are committable. Only those feasible ones, whose context conditions can be satisfied by the current knowledge and belief state, can be committed as new intentions. The execution of intentions may affect the mental states and generate more stimulus, which makes the whole multi-agent system evolve endlessly.
In the following, propositional (modal) logic with boolean connectives → and F (false), where primitive actions are denoted by a special set of propositions, is used as the specification language of beliefs, goals and intentions of resource-limited agents. Negation is introduced as abbreviation: ¬p (p → F ).
Let set W of propositional wffs be the universe of discourse under concern. W ? {?ϕ|ϕ ∈ W } will be the universe of test goals (e.g., ?p is a goal of checking whether p holds or not [COH 90]). We assume any agent a has three finite sets of formulas:
, and Ψ a i ⊆ W , which refer to the current beliefs, goals and intentions of a, respectively. To interpret the formulas in these sets, we define operators corresponding to the traditional modal logic axiom schemes K, T, D, P and N [NER 93] as follows. DEFINITION 23. -Let M be any modal operator, Ψ be a set of propositional formulas.
where Sub(Ψ) is the set of sub-formulas of Ψ. Now, the belief, goal and intention attitudes of an agent can be modeled as deduction structures. B a = B a , ρ b , G a = G a , ρ g , and I a = I a , ρ i , where Note that in definition 23, the allowable sets of formulas in a mental state of an agent is rather limited, because mixtures of modalities are not expressible. For instance, "believing that the goal is to believe p" cannot be expressed as a belief here. Of course, this can be easily solved by extending the operators. However, on the other hand, such a limitation will simplify the implementations. For otherwise, certain realism constraint (strong, weak, or normal) [RAO 95] has to be considered between different mental attitudes, which is difficult to maintain, even though it is possible to set up. In implementation, "believing that the goal is to believe p" can be approximated as "believing that the goal is to bring about p", and by assuming "goals are known", it's sufficient to simply treat p as in the goal set Ψ g . As such, it's not necessary to consider all three kinds of attitudes and make sure certain realism constraint is satisfied.
DEFINITION 24. -The belief, goal and intention attitudes of an agent a are given by
We assume a BDI agent is composed of four components: beliefs, goals, intentions, and plans. Thus, a BDI agent a can be denoted by < B a , G a , I a , P a >, where the components are belief attitude, goal attitude, intention attitude, and plan set, respectively. Then, by following the results from the previous section, we have: COROLLARY 25. -For any BDI agent a, there exists a unique concise-widest chainpreserved split for B a , G a and I a , respectively. Let finite set Ag be the set of agents under concern. The following relations over Ag will be used later to compare two (sets of) agents. 
DEFINITION 26. -Given any two agents a, b ∈ Ag. a and b are equivalent, denoted by
a ≡ F b, iff B a ≡ D B b ∧ G a ≡ D G b ∧ I a ≡ D I b ∧ P a = P b . a is weaker than b, denoted by a F b, iff B a D B b ∧ G a D G b ∧ I a D I b ∧ P a ⊆ P b .
Revising Inconsistent Mental Sets
The problem of belief revision-how an agent should revise its beliefs upon observing new information by committing to minimal changes-has been an active research in both philosophy and artificial intelligence[ALC 85, LEH 95, FRI 99, HER 99]. As pointed out in [FRI 99], most approaches to belief change start with a collection of postulates, and show their reasonableness by providing semantic models. The work in this section, however, is not to propose yet another set of postulates for belief revision, but is to simply give an algorithm for revising a special class of deduction structures. The ontology where observations are taken to be knowledge is assumed [FRI 99].
By meta-level predicate cons(S) we mean formula set S is consistent. Given a pseudo-structure U, {M P } , where U ⊆ W ∪ W ? is finite. For any S ⊆ U such that cons(S) holds, r ∈ S is a logical trigger of p in S iff r → p ∈ S * ρ . The trigger set of
s
Sometimes an agent needs to reconcile an inconsistent set of formulas. The following atomic procedure LC can be used to make S ⊆ U consistent.
LC(S, ρ)= procedure(inout: S, in: ρ) while ∃p · trig(¬p, S) = ∅ ∧ trig(p, S) = ∅ if |trig(¬p, S)| ≤ |trig(p, S)| then S := S − trig(¬p, S)
5. true counts implicitly as an element of any consistent formula set.
else S := S − trig(p, S)
Procedure LC is nondeterministic because of the arbitrary order of selection operations 6 . However, it doesn't matter as long as it's terminable, since in practice, an agent inherently has nondeterministic and non-monotonic reasoning capabilities. With the procedure LC in mind, we assume the sets under our concern are all consistent when being referred to individually.
The following atomic procedure is used to revise a consistent formula set V with another consistent formula set T , which typically refers to new observed information and will be kept with higher degree of certainty 7 .
ρ is terminable; and upon termination, the set S is consistent.
PROOF. -In procedure V, T
ρ , even though T and V are consistent, S may not be the case. Loop (2) is used to make S consistent. There are two cases that may result in trig(¬p, S) = ∅: either ¬p is derivable only from some subset of V (trig(¬p, V ) holds), or the derivation of ¬p needs contributions from both of V and T . The former is dealt with in loop (3), and the latter is further divided into four sub-cases. The derivation of ¬p may start from a formula r in either T or V , and the final part of the derivation may also belong to either T * ρ or V * ρ . In each of these cases, the corresponding inference chain is broken in some appropriate point so that ¬p will no longer be derivable from r. Loop (7) deserves more explanation. When r → s ∈ T * ρ holds, we 6. If necessary, we might want to enrich the epistemic states with information describing relative strength of beliefs and even allow the relative strength information changes overtime. Then the relative strength of beliefs can be considered in the process of selection. 7. Here we treat all the elements in T as having the same level of strength, which is higher than those in V . Instead of such flat structure, a more subtly stratified structure may be considered.
actually have trig(¬p, T ) = ∅. It is untouched in the current iteration, since it will be captured later anyway. Since in some later iteration of loop (2) where ¬p is chosen (as p), trig(p, S) will be treated by loops (3)-(7). This time when loop (7) applies, r → s ∈ T * ρ will not hold, for otherwise both trig(p, T ) and trig(¬p, T ) will hold, which contracts the fact that T is consistent. Moreover, there must exist q 1 , q 2 such that r ∈ trig(q 1 , S) ∧ q 1 → q 2 ∈ V * ρ ∧ q 2 ∈ trig(s, S) holds, so the selection of q 1 , q 2 will always succeed.
Since V and T are finite set of formulas, there only exist finite number of inconsistent cases. The procedure V, T ρ covers all the cases that may cause inconsistence and the number of inconsistence decreases as the iteration goes on, thus, V, T ρ is terminable, and when terminated, S is consistent. s
Next we show that the algorithm satisfies the AGM postulates [ALC 85]. Let be a revision operator that takes a belief set Π and a formula ϕ and returns a new belief set Π ϕ. The following AGM postulates are an attempt to characterize the intuition of "minimal change":
R5. cons(Π ϕ) if and only if cons(ϕ);
ρ satisfies the AGM postulates R1-R8.
PROOF. -Note that V * ρ corresponds to Π in R1-R8. Case 1: T is a singleton {ϕ}. In this case, the resulting set of procedure V, ϕ ρ , denoted by S , corresponds to V * ρ ϕ. R1 and R2 are trivially true since V, ϕ ρ remains to be consistent and ϕ ∈ V, ϕ ρ . If ϕ is consistent with V (i.e., ¬ϕ ∈ V * ρ ), then V, ϕ ρ consists precisely of those implied by the combination of V * ρ with {ϕ}, thus R3 and R4 hold. R5 holds obviously since we assume {ϕ} is consistent and by theorem 29 the algorithm guarantees the consistency of S . R6 holds since the algorithm is not sensitive to the syntactic form of ϕ.
R7 and R8 together state that if ψ is consistent with Π ϕ then Π (ϕ ∧ ψ) is the result of adding ψ to Π ϕ. Suppose ψ is consistent with V, ϕ ρ . Case 1.1: Suppose ϕ is consistent with V . We have V,
Case 2: T is of form {ϕ 1 , · · · , ϕ i }. In this case, let φ = i ϕ i , then it reduces to case 1. s
There are many ways to revise V with T being preserved. The way we choose, as given in procedure V, T ρ , is based on such criteria: (a) since T is preferable, when T ∪ V is revised, the formulas in T will not be dropped out unless it's inconsistent by itself (if that happens, T will be made consistent first); (b) We assume individual facts (e.g., p) are more suspectable than relational facts (e.g., p → r, which connects two pieces together). So, formulas of the form r → p is preferable to those of the form r (which is reflected in loop (3)- (5)).
V, T
ρ will be abbreviated as V, T when ρ = {M P } and V ρ when T = ∅.
A Logical Splitting Strategy
We first consider the case where only the belief component is affected in logical splitting. That is, we examine how to split an agent a = B a , G a , I a , P a into a set of agents (they may or may not share the same identity with a) who have the same goal, intention and plan components as a's except that their belief components partition the belief component of a.
Usually, a deduction structure is more powerful than the sum of its parts. In other words, let d = ∆, ρ , Γ is an arbitrary split of ∆ such that ∆ = γ∈Γ γ, then we have ∆ * ρ ⊇ γ∈Γ γ * ρ . It's too strong by demanding ∆ * ρ = γ∈Γ γ * ρ when splitting d. Actually it only holds when ∃γ ∈ Γ · γ = ∆. This might be acceptable for γ itself, since the cloning agent with γ as its mental attitude will be able to do whatever a can do. However, the other resulted cloning agents might be too weak in their deliberation computing. For example, when B a = {p, p → q}, and a splits itself according to {{p, p → q}, {p}, {p → q}}, then the clone with {p → q} as its initial belief may not be able to make correct decisions when the decisions rely on the truth of q but it has never been informed about the the truth of either p or q so far.
Then, what's the reasonable weakest conditions that should be satisfied when splitting an agent based on a split of its mental components? From the last section we know that the split at least should be chain-preserved. When an agent splits itself according to a chain-preserved split Γ of its mental attitude, the amount of communication among the resulted cloning agents is minimized, even though there is no γ ∈ Γ such that γ = ∆ holds. In the following definition, we encode such a splitting strategy into the splitting procedure LS. 
We have the following relation between the original agent and the set of resulted cloning agents.
Obviously, for any a ∈ Ag, any two splits , Γ 2 ) ). This means when agent a intends to split itself logically, it can choose any chain-preserved split in cp(B a ).
In fact, there is an optimal choice in cp(B a ), that is, the unique concise-widest chain-preserved split wcp(B a ). It is optimal for two reasons. First, wcp(B a ) being widest, none of the sets in wcp(B a ) can be divided further with the original inference chains in B a preserved. Thus, by following wcp(B a ), it's ensured that the belief component of every resulted cloning agents is as small as possible, which is exactly one of the criteria of agent splitting-make agents smarter and smaller.
Secondly, wcp(B a ) being concise, the subsumption relation in wcp(B a ) is empty. Thus, it's ensured that none of the resulted cloning agents is redundant. In other words, the original set of concerns of a are completely distributed to the resulted cloning agents, and there is no overlapped concerns among them. In addition, this also reduces the potential negotiations on responsibility that otherwise may occur. Here is a counter example. Suppose a 1 and a 2 are two clones of a with respect to the split Γ ∈ cp(B a ), where B a1 ∈ Γ, B a2 ∈ Γ, and B a1 ⊆ B a2 . Then, a 1 and a 2 may commit to doing the same actions (or solving the same problems) since they have overlapped concerns. To avoid multiple commitments to the same action, a 1 and a 2 need to negotiate to decide their responsibilities. 1 = B a 1 , G a 1 , I a 1 , P a 1 and a 2 = B a 2 , G a 2 , I a 2 , P a 2 are equivalent wrt. the belief attitudes, denoted by a 1 b a 2 , iff B a1 ≡ D B a2 . a 1 is weaker than a 2 wrt. the belief attitudes, denoted by a 1 b a 2 , iff B a1 D B a2 . Agent set A 1 is weaker than agent set A 2 wrt. belief attitudes, denoted by
Two agents a
LEMMA 34. -Given any agents a, g ∈ Ag and any split Γ ∈ cp(B a ).
F S (LS(a, Γ) ) b g iff a b g.
PROOF.
-Let a = F S (LS(a, Γ) ). 
As we have defined, a BDI agent has three mental components. An agent can split itself similarly based on the chain-preserved split of its goal or intention structures. An agent even can create cloning agents by splitting the three mental structures at the same time as long as the splitting makes sense, which may result in many splitting combinations.
On the other hand, an agent may choose not to divide its goal component because the goals could be taken as ties among the set of cloning agents. Common goals are semantic constraints for generating shared plans [GRO 99]. In cooperative problem solving, the competitive agents make compromises because of the common goals. The helping behaviors among teammates in teamwork settings [GRO 96, YEN 01] are also enabled by the awareness of common goals. It is also reasonable to have the intention component shared by the cloning agents, which is useful in preventing these agents from diverting from the way their originator agent has already chosen. However, whether to split a specific component and which splitting combination to choose are decision issues in system implementations, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Related Work
The idea of splitting is ubiquitous in different fields of computer science, such as object splitting [ , an object is taken as a composite entity with a collection of slices organized in a delegation hierarchy. The slices of a composite object do not have their own identities. They only reflect the different perspectives or viewpoints of their affiliated object. Compared with object splitting, the clones of an agent also can form a society connected by certain splitting relations. Among others (capabilities of proactiveness, deliberation, and reflection, etc.), one difference is that agent clones could have their own identities, and may have their correspondences in the real or imaginary world.
Agent splitting reflects the idea of separation of concerns, which is hotting up again with the emerging of aspect-oriented programming paradigm [KIC 97]. However, the main issue there is to break the tangling of different concerns to make the software artifacts more understandable and maintainable. Here, the alternation of the uniting and splitting processes is more like a methodology for binding a team of agents together, for re-adjusting the behavior of individual agents periodically, and for evolving their shared mental model proactively and cooperatively.
Agent cloning was proposed as a comprehensive approach to the problem of local agent overloads [SYC 96, SHE 98], where agents may clone, pass tasks to others, die, or merge. A model of cloning based on prediction of missed task deadlines and idle times on the agent's schedule was proposed in the RETSINA multi-agent infrastructure [SYC 96 ]. A stochastic model of decision making based on dynamic programming was given in [SHE 98 ] to determine the optimal timing for cloning. By simulation experiments, they showed how cloning affects the performance of an MAS. Rather than focusing on decision issues of whether and when to clone as in [SYC 96, SHE 98] , in this paper we identify a logical splitting strategy which can be used by an agent to do deliberation computing based on its awareness of its current focus. A key implication emerging from our study is that the cycle of unitingsplitting could be a promising approach for evolving shared mental model of team agents [SYC 91, SYC 94] . No doubt, decision making on whether, when, and how (by using which splitting strategy) is very important for understanding the impact of splitting on the performance of an agent team. How mental splitting may affect team performance and how to evolve shared mental model effectively by leveraging the cycle of uniting-splitting would be interesting topics for further studies.
Another related work about agent splitting comparable with the work presented in this paper is the AURECON project [HAN 02]. In AURECON, the control decisions on agent splitting and melting are studied to improve the quality and efficiency of collaborative problem solving. An agent will decide what parts of its assigned problem to delegate when it experiences an overload situation, and try to melt with other agents to increase the quality of problem solving and decrease unnecessary communicational effort. Based on the desired complexity bounds and a set of domain-specific indivisi-ble variables and constraint, an optimal solution is chosen from alternatives such that the dependence measure between the two candidate parts is minimal. As far as agent splitting is concerned, both the approaches presented here and that in [HAN 02] require certain feasibility constraint be abided to minimize the dependence measure. In this paper, the unique concise-widest split in logical splitting can be taken as a solution to minimizing the dependence measures.
It's interesting to relate agent splitting to distributed knowledge [FAG 95 ]. Both of them try to connect the overall knowledge with the knowledge of components. However, distributed knowledge deals with how to reasoning based on the combination of the component knowledges, while agent splitting deals with how to split the mental attitude reasonablely into parts with minimal or no dependences.
In the belief revision community, some relational approach is adopted (e.g., in [WAS 98]) to structure belief bases, where disconnected components of the original base represent beliefs about unrelated subjects. Generally speaking, agent splitting is also based upon partitioning by maintaining a certain relation. The special chain relation proposed in this paper enables an agent to separate different concerns and delegate them to its clones. Moreover, the existence and uniqueness of the concisewidest chain-preserved split makes it possible to create clones with no redundancy.
Conclusion
In this paper, we prove for any finite deduction structure there exists a unique concise-widest chain-preserved split. Then, a logical splitting strategy is proposed where an agent can split itself by following certain chain-preserved split of its mental structure. Split as such, all the inference chains in the original mental structure can be preserved afterward. Most importantly, when the unique concise-widest chainpreserved split is used, it can be sure that (1) the mental structure under the concern of every resulted cloning agents is optimally small, and (2) the original set of concerns are completely distributed to the resulted cloning agents, i.e., no two concerns are overlapped.
As we have mentioned, agent logical splitting is useful in at least four fields. First, smarter and smaller agents are preferable in mobile computing. Instead of transferring the original megalithic agent, it's efficient to only transfer the parts related to the problems under concerns. Second, it will enable an agent to adjust its concerns dynamically based on its recognition of the current situation, which may further enable the agent to make rapid and rational decisions when situation shifting occurs. Third, in periodic team synchronization (PTS) domains where agents can periodically synchronize their behaviors with no restriction on communication, it can be employed as a critical process for maintaining the shared mental models among a team of agents, which has been the focus of a great deal of research spanning diverse disciplines from business management, distributed artificial intelligence, to psychology [ILG 93]. Lastly, it is helpful in alleviating the complexity of reasoning about relevant informa-tion, and in better anticipating both explicit and implicit information needs based on the recognition of the current situation.
There are several issues for future work. In certain circumstances, goal splitting and intention splitting are both possible and desirable. It may be more efficient by allowing different (groups of) cloning agents to pursue different (even distinct sets of) goals. As we mentioned, to split an agent by partitioning its goal component alone is not difficult, since the results of partitioning belief component are still applicable. The difficulty emerges from the inter-relationships between different mental components. Even though we assume there is no mixture of modalities, there are still many situations that certain sets of beliefs are relevant to certain goals, and situations that several goals rely on a particular belief, etc. When partitioning more than one mental component simultaneously, certain constraints on the semantic connections between the mental components should be considered. There may even have no optimal solutions. Such a limitation at semantic level exists even when only a single mental component is involved in splitting. The concept of chain-preserved split presented in this paper is at the syntax level. There may have semantic dependency between two sets of beliefs, even though they are seemingly independent in syntax. Hence, the correctness of splitting based on chain-preserved splits heavily depends on the efforts of knowledge engineering. To explore agent splitting at semantic level would be an interesting topic for future works.
